Philippine e-Legal Forum

Just recently, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision (Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No.  155800, 10 March 2006) in connection with a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 (psychological incapacity) of the Family Code.  The Supreme Court sustained the nullity of the marriage based on the psychological incapacity of the wife (respondent).

In that petition, the petitioner-husband claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, including: (1) she introduced her illegitimate child to her petitioner-husband as an adopted child of her family; (2) she misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist, with a degree in psychology; (3) she falsely claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent;  (4) she invented friends and, under the names of those imaginary friends, sent lengthy letters to petitioner-husband touting her as the “number one moneymaker” in the commercial industry worth 2 million; and (5) she represented herself as a person of greater means, altering her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income.

The Supreme Court decided the petition using the guidelines (click here or here) set forth in Molina, thus:

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.  The petitioner must be able to establish the cause of action with preponderance of evidence (however, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs). The petitioner-husband, apart from his own testimony, presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior.  He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. 

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.  It was shown that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.

Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.  She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.  In this case, while respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, the expert witnesses did not explicitly state that the psychological incapacity was incurable. However, there was a good reason for such silence.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. On the other hand, in Santos (decided in January 1995), the Supreme Court omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.  Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca vs. Pesca, the Court countered an  argument  that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.  Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him.  If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

Other note-worthy matters:

 

Republic Act No. 8353, also known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997", reclasifies rape to a crime against persons.  It amended the Revised Penal Code, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is Committed-

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into other person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement of penal institution.
3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity.
4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime.
(5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
(6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immune-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim.
(7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or paramilitary units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime.
(8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim suffered permanent physical mutilation or disability.
(9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
(10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.

Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed by any of the ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.

In a previous case arising from the 2003 "Oakwood mutiny", Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 427, declaring a "state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to quell it.  Proclamation 427 pertinently reads:

WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;

The basis of said Proclamation is Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which pertinently reads:

Sec. 18.  The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.  xxx (Underscoring supplied)

These are the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President, which provides a "sequence" of "graduated powers".  From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.  In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.  However, these conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power.  The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."

What’s the significance of the declaration of a "state of rebellion"?  The Supreme Court said:

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation.  But this Court’s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration.  This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance.  For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Corporations are no longer allowed to use “Metro Manila” as a principal place of business in the Articles of Incorporation (”AOI”), as provided under Memorandum Circular No. 3 (26 January 2006) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Prior to this Circular, corporations located within Metro Manila usually indicate “Metro Manila”, without specifying the city or municipality where they are actually located, as their corporate address or principal place of business. This is intended to obviate the need of amending the AOI if the corporation subsequently transfers its place of business.

From a litigation point of view, the more obvious significance is the determination of venue in filing of cases. Like natural persons or individuals, a corporation also has a residence, which is the address specified in its AOI duly filed with the SEC. A case may be filed, for or against the corporation, at a court where the corporation “resides”.

With the increased media coverage this past months regarding businesses undergoing corporate rehabilitation (e.g., College Assurance Plan [CAP] and Pacific Plans, Inc. [PPI]), even the general pubic has started asking questions about corporate rehabilitation, a legal option that is available to distressed corporations.

Philippine corporate rehabilitation, which is similar to Chapter 11 reorganization in the United States of America, is distinct and separate from insolvency. Rehabilitation is intended to enable a distressed corporation to gain a new lease on life, so to speak, and to continue its business as a going concern. On the other hand, insolvency is intended to close and liquidate an insolvent corporation.

Jurisdiction over petitions for corporate rehabilitation was previously lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), pursuant to Presidential Decree (”P.D.“) No. 902-A, as amended by P.D. 1758 and P.D. 1799. While Republic Act No. 8799 (otherwise known as the “Securities Regulations Code of 2000“) transferred this jurisdiction to regular courts, P.D. 902-A remains to be the governing law on corporate rehabilitations. The procedure is set forth in the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (”Interim Rules).

Thrust of rehabilation. - Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

Issuance of Stay Order. - If the court is convinced that the petition is sufficient in form and substance, it will issue a Stay Order, which shall include, among other things, the appointment of a Receiver and the suspension of ALL pending claims against the corporation under rehabilitation.

Pari passu treatment of creditors. - All assets of a corporation under rehabilitation receivership are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors to preclude one from obtaining an advantage or preference over another by the expediency of attachment, execution or otherwise. All the creditors ought to stand on equal footing, with due regard to the rights of secured creditors.

Corporate rehabilitation is theoretically expeditious, but actual practice shows it could be otherwise. We had an ocassion to write the Supreme Court about these problems and, hopefully, the Supreme Court’s referral to the rules committee will bear fruit in the immediate future.